This paper will look at some recurring phenomena in large group
process that have to do with the distribution of power. What
kind of ‚power‘ is it possible to have, to seize, or to be
given, as a conductor or as a participant in the large analytic
group ? How do power struggles and cyclically recurring
processes of power distribution in the group mirror current
events and structures in society at large ?
A heuristic model of psychosocial development based on
Containment <-> Confrontation is suggested as an approach to
dealing with these phenomena.
At the 5th IAGP Pacific Rim Conference in
Melbourne I gave a paper on the idea of “Tyrannophobia” – a term
coined by Th. Hobbes in Leviathan – which addressed group
leadership and the crisis inherent in democracy. Here I
want to pursue this theme further in the context of recent world
developments, which suggest to me that Western democracy is in
an even greater crisis than I had thought, due perhaps to its
often wilful confusion with military imperialism and with the
globalization of a neo-liberal market economy. In order to
clarify these issues it has to be underlined that democracy is
not just about freedom, as some would have it, but also about
justice, which imposes limits on freedom. Freedom and justice
are in fact intrinsically conflicted, at loggerheads with one
another, and democracy, in its various imperfect forms, is about
managing this conflict.
In the first part of this presentation I’m going to look
a little at the social economics and politics of the
“Warlord-Syndrome”, in the second part I’ll suggest some aspects
of group analytic work which seem to mirror these perverse
conditions. Most of my material for this first part comes from
findings of a workshop in the Dept. of Anthropology at the
University of Cologne on “War as the Norm, as a Component of the
Market System”.
After the wars in Ethiopia many of the warlords involved
became very successful commercial entrepreneurs who got along
with each other quite well. They moved from violence against
each other to commerce with each other without
difficulty, as both were in their own self-interest. I myself
had a shocking experience of such a phenomenon when I found
myself in jail in Belfast in Northern Ireland for 3 months in
1972. I had been working there as a journalist and was
imprisoned under charges of terrorist activities, from which I
was later acquitted. This was a unique opportunity to
experience the warlord-syndrome, since with me in prison were
two top leaders of both the Catholic IRA and the Protestant UDF
terrorist militias. The alarming cynicism of the situation was
revealed to me when I saw these men, who outside of jail had
seemed intent on destroying each other’s forces, walking
together around the prison yard making gun-running deals -
actually selling each other weapons.
The Cologne workshop informed me that
one of the first strategies of warlords during wartime is to
destroy alternative sources of income such as fields and
factories, in order to create a work force that can only subsist
via war. Afterwards, the population can only survive via the
projects of the warlords. Thus war and violence can be seen as
good for business, in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Congo, Sierra
Leone and in the Balkans - where the shift is now from Kosovo to
Albania and to parts of Macedonia - but also in Colombia (where
it is not just about drugs, but also emeralds).
The Cologne studies confirm how effectively terrorist
organisations are operated by warlords of the IRA in Ireland and
ETA in the Basque Provinces. Here profitable businesses are run
on the basis of protection rackets, arms smuggling and (note
this!) in training such groups in other countries. A great deal
of money has flowed from the USA to the IRA in the form of
donations, but these funds get thin when there are no victims,
so it can be important to create new victims, especially among
one’s own women and children. Marketing and the media are
important in order to keep the issues in the public eye
In Africa, particularly in Somalia and Uganda, northern
Kenya and southern Ethiopia, where gun-running is the chief
commodity, the following patterns are observed. In order for
them to buy guns, the fathers must obtain cattle for their sons,
often from the mother as an advance on their inheritance. These
guns can be used by the sons as a means of increased income
through robbery and pillage. Semi-automatic weapons are
especially prized. The young men become more independent and
self-sufficient in this way, the gerontocracy (rule by the aged)
is weakened, the elders are no longer able to regulate conflict
as they used to. They may say “But we have never attacked our
neighbours, the Samburu tribe”, but the young men are no longer
listening to them.
Killing has now become a productive activity whereas
previously, killing an enemy made one unclean, as Freud
describes it in Totem and Taboo. After a purification
ceremony, such killers usually became healers, especially of
pregnant women with sicknesses. Among the Yanomami, successful
warriors achieved honour and respect, but only in this capacity
and not in any other, since their survival and ageing rate, and
therefore their wisdom, were the lowest in the adult population.

Now the problem is how to reintegrate and re-socialize
these young warriors. In South Africa 22.000 people die each
year from internal violence, in the Palestinian territories
6000. The war goes on within the society, re-socializing
becomes nearly impossible. Even harder is the situation in
Liberia or northern Uganda where young children are kidnapped
and brought up to be warriors and killers.
In African societies both AIDS and war contribute to
internal violence via the resurgence of the belief in
witchcraft. If one is struck by Aids or a wartime bullet, the
first question is of course: Why me? The explanation in our
societies tends to be that one was not careful enough or simply
unlucky, but in these African countries the cause is generally
attributed to witchcraft. Everyone and anyone can be a
bewitcher, i.e. a potential enemy. Thus there is no community
solidarity in the face of the common threat, but rather the
opposite, internal terror, everyone against everyone else.
Anti-witchcraft campaigners, often in the Catholic Church,
search out the guilty parties. The Uganda Martyrs Guild hunts
down witches and supposed cannibals who are then made to
confess. Enormous anxiety is generated: opportunities for
denunciation are rife (reminding one of the Inquisition during
the European Counter-Reformation). The question is, whom did
the suspect cannibal eat and who helped him? The threatened
suspects are forced to give out the names of supposed “helpers”.
John Darby of the US Institute of Peace has studied how
in Israel and the Occupied Territories, the Basque Provinces and
in Sri Lanka, violence became contagious between governments,
militias and splinter groups. Even in S. Africa after a
successful peace process and the work of Truth and
Reconciliation Commission there has been an enormous increase in
criminal acts of violence, the guns are still in circulation and
the mentality too. As Darby puts it: “The societies get used to
it, as they are no longer able to control the violence which
they had themselves engendered.”
Such protracted violence means that traditionally
established language groups or ethnic “belonging” no longer
function as builders of identity. When people kill off each
other, differences are invented, new identities are created. In
parts of former Yugoslavia among much of the poorer peasantry,
religion had been for a long time more or less syncretistic, it
was not so important whether one was Moslem, Catholic or
Orthodox. There were Catholic saints who could cure some ills,
Moslem sages or holy places could cure others, Orthodox priests
were good at blessing new-born children etc. Communism was here
often well accepted, not only because of a certain economic
stability it offered, but also because it encouraged these
syncretistic tendencies through intermarriage. During and after
the war however, genealogies and ancestors became fixed or
faked, suddenly everyone seemed to know where they came from,
although this was mostly quite impossible to determine.
There is of course a reverse side to this phenomenon.
When the Kurdish PKK stepped up their activities in Turkey after
1988, an estimated total of 3 million people fled as refugees to
Western Turkey, especially when in the mid-1990s whole areas
were depopulated by the military seeking to suppress the
guerrilla movement. These refugees lived for a long time in tent
camps, with high sickness rates and no opportunities for
education and medical care. They then gravitated to the edges of
the large cities where their social bonds collapsed, creating
perhaps generations of hopelessness.
In Kashmir suicide and divorce rates, drug use and
prostitution increased with the war. But many of the guerrilla
leaders became very rich through land speculation, ecological
devastation, illegal trafficking and booms in construction work.
In Afghanistan, perhaps the best-known modern case, war became
not just a means to an end but an end in itself, a commodity or
currency within the market system, with arms production a major
factor in the success of the warlords before the Russians had
been driven out. But ultimately the influx of foreign weaponry
had made the whole population increasingly dependent on these
outside sources. It was of course the Taliban government which,
in its fundamentalist, authoritarian fashion, tried to stop the
rot, via a state monopoly on violence and repression. As we are
witnessing today, with the overthrow of the Taliban regime the
warlords have returned, with their local economies based on the
production of and traffic in arms and drugs.
* * *
Now let us return to group analytic work. I only have
time to point briefly to some fields of comparison, in training
programmes, in clinical technique and in certain recent
theorizing.
I was first alerted to these concerns in my training work
in the Ukraine, and later and to a lesser extent in Israel. In
the Ukraine I became aware of how the ‘social unconscious’,
using Earl Hopper’s terminology, can not only become conscious
through acting-out, but also how this acting-out does not
necessarily disappear by being worked through, it stays there on
an organisational level. We know that among the post-Soviet
countries Ukraine is one of the most affected by the emergence
of mafias, which to a large extent have taken over the political
and economic vacuum and stand in the way of democratic
progress. In the large analytic groups in the Ukraine one could
already observe the jockeying for power and the marking out of
territories in a typical warlord fashion. There were new markets
being created here, not for guns, jewels or drugs, but for the
institution and establishment of local training institutes for
psychotherapy.
Within the large group process, leading psychiatrists and
university professors were staking their claims and
ideologically or economically rallying their followers as to who
would take power when the foreigners had gone. Since we analysts
often understand so little about the use of real political power
– we tend to concentrate only on the underlying issues of
narcissistic psychopathology – it was often hard to tell which
such institutes were going to be benign forces for good, and
which would be scams, rip-offs or authoritarian clan structures.
I think, following Volkan’s ideas, that it is the lack of
adequate mourning which enhances this confusion and it is the
lack of a civil society which makes such mourning difficult.

It is of course a great problem when aggressive rage and
mourning become indistinguishable. When we watch the funerals of
“martyrs” of the IRA or of the Palestinian Hamas on television,
with guns fired by masked participants and women screaming out
of hate more than grief, it is hard not to be deeply shocked,
perhaps especially by the behaviour of these women. But we need
to understand how such often desperately oppressed, one might
say “burnt-out” women, by giving vent to their rage also stand
to gain significant benefits in social acceptance and prestige
by their behaviour.
But we also have examples of how a shift from rage to
genuine mourning can be instigated as a female issue,
specifically around motherhood, when we see the inspiring work
of the Argentinean Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, or the Mothers
for Peace in Ireland and the Women in Black in Israel..
In the Ukrainian case I was fortunate to witness an instance of
this gender issue, significantly in a small analytic group
rather than a large one. In one session two male psychiatrists
began a political debate that escalated into a frightening
shouting match. One of them was a nostalgic supporter of the old
Soviet system, the other a fervently radical nationalist
reactionary. Their yelling silenced all the others and I thought
they might start a physical fight in the group.
After
a while I ventured the opinion that some conflicts just don’t go
away through therapy, they may be too deep for that. At this
some of the women in the group began to talk of relatives
who had been killed in nationalist pogroms or who had been
denounced to the KGB and died in Stalinist prison camps. Almost
everyone, it turned out, had had a relative who had been
deported to Siberia and died there, for one reason or another,
or perhaps for no good reason at all. The deeply moving
awareness of group mourning and reconciliation which followed,
showed nevertheless how necessary the previous ideological
outburst had been.
In
another example we had to deal in a group with three
psychiatrists who worked in the same provincial hospital. (Of
course they should never have been in the same group, but as
anyone knows who has worked in building new institutes in such
places, this is sometimes hard to avoid. The few interested
professionals all know each other and also often know how to
“rig the setting” somewhat. This is of a great pity, because we
try to train them in working with so-called “stranger groups”
where no-one knows anyone else, without them having really
experienced this setting.)
Now one of this Ukrainian “trio infernal” was the boss,
I’ll call him Sergei, a rather sullen and extremely silent man
who seemed to have the other two, Natasha and Ivan, under
control. They hardly contributed anything to the group except
provocations, jokes and cynical remarks. They seemed to be
plotting how to survive the whole experience without putting
their cards on the table, in order just to gain their
credentials and then get down to business. It was a kind of
mafia “omertà” or vow of silence. When heavily confronted by
one group member over this behaviour, they all three drove off
home without a word before the last block session.
In the next training block some months later all three
reappeared. The group talked a little about what had happened
last time, without much interest, occasionally someone had a
small outburst, since the trio was still not much more
forthcoming than usual. But it was somewhat more restrained and
less dominant. The group seemed to acquiesce fairly peaceably
to a remark made by Sasha, the man who had confronted ‘the boss’
the last time: “We are used to the mafia here, we are not even
particularly angry with them, as long as they leave us in
peace. Perhaps it is better we are not too involved in their
business.”
As a result much good work was done by the group over the
whole training, even within this trio: Igor the ‘boss’ seemed to
gain in empathy and sense of humour over the sessions, while
Natasha, very seductive and the most intelligent of the trio,
who originally had come provocatively dressed like a call-girl,
seemed to make great personal progress, perhaps just by silently
and vicariously working through some problems of other female
members. Ivan, who had seemed the most disturbed in his
patently perverse structure, could only adapt superficially to
the group without really profiting from it.
I suggest that the mechanisms of used by the group and
its conductor in this impasse were grouped around a reciprocal
dynamic of ‘containment<->confrontation’ - something that
politicians could learn from - but unfortunately I don’t have
time to discuss this further here (see my previous papers).
*
Now Israel is a very different case. Not only is there
an established and highly sophisticated civil society in place,
there is also a deep understanding of mourning as an individual
and collective process with a long history. But there is also a
strong tradition of self-reliance and a deep mistrust of outside
interference, having to do with the history of the British
Mandate over the territory and of the subsequent unhappy
experience with the UN contingents there before independence. So
we outsiders as training conductors do have to contend with
feelings of powerlessness vis-à-vis much of the in-fighting and
lobbying for territory and power, which setting up new training
institutes necessarily involves. The competences for doing
therapeutic work and for political decision-making have had to
be divided, perhaps even the stricter the better, though this is
only a partial solution, since it works better in theory than in
practice. But the questions of uncertain boundaries and
dividing walls affect the whole country, so we are dealing with
the intractability of the foundation matrix here.

I’ll close with a brief word on current theorizing over
some of these themes. I’m referring to a highly-praised recently
published book by Cohen, Ettin and Fidler in the USA entitled
Group Psychotherapy and Political Reality - A Two-Way Mirror,
which I think is more of a distorting mirror and seriously
confuses some salient issues. The authors seem to think that
group analysis and democracy are more or less the same thing,
that analytic process groups build democracy in terms of
participation, power-sharing and what they term the “synergy
between cooperation (or affiliation) and competition (or
autonomy)”, as suggested by the socio-biologist E.O.Wilson. In
this model there is absolutely no conflict between individuals
being essentially rivalrous, envious or power-oriented and them
also working together in constructive and harmonious fashion.
This Utopian vision is what you get when you more or less
throw out Freud and his ideas about the Unconscious and about
Eros, Thanatos and the Drive Theory. I think our work is
something very different from building democracy, especially
such a flawed idea of democracy which takes no concern for the
basic conflict between freedom and justice that I mentioned at
the beginning. Our work is to analyze the problem, not to think
we have the solution.
It comes as no surprise to see that these authors take as
their guidelines Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History
and Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations. I
would say, with some reference to Afghanistan and more so to the
current Iraq situation, if we are going to insist on exporting
democracy, let’s at least realize how hard it is to get it
right. And if this seems like simple Eurocentric Bush-bashing
and disparagement of the US administration, I’ll temper it with
an admittedly rather radical quote from Frantz Fanon’s The
Wretched of Earth:
“Europe
undertook the leadership of the world with ardour, cynicism and
violence. Look at how the shadow of her palaces stretches out
ever further! Every one of her movements has burst the
bounds of space and thought. Europe has declined all humility
and all modesty; but she has also set her face against all
solicitude and tenderness…When I search for Man in the technique
and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of
man, and an avalanche of murders.”
Edward Said, from whose essay Freud and the
Non-European I have lifted this quote, goes on to comment:
“Fanon rejects the European model entirely, and demands instead
that all human beings collaborate together in the invention of
new ways to create what he calls “the new man, whom Europe has
been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth.”
This too, I must admit, seems in the light of Freud’s
cultural pessimism to be just another Utopia, although of course
we must never give up hope. But in the meantime we could
recognize the modesty of Wilfred Bion’s idea of “making the best
of a bad job” and be more circumspect about our own
self-idealization and imperialistic basic assumptions when it
comes to exporting a particular form of Political Democracy or
Psychoanalytic Group Therapy Perhaps in both fields, when
the flame wars and the actual violence are over, or at least
somewhat contained, the warlords may be not only part of the
problem but also part of the solution. At any rate they may
contribute to avoiding anarchy and provide some basic structure
and stability. There is a kind of genuine power-sharing
involved here, which we in the West usually aren’t so willing to
do. We still have a lot to learn.
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